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Abstract
The modeling of complex systems such as ecological or socio-economic systems can be very challenging.
Although various modeling approaches exist, they are generally not compatible and mutually consistent,
and empirical data often do not allow one to decide what model is the right one, the best one, or
most appropriate one. Moreover, as the recent financial and economic crisis shows, relying on a single,
idealized model can be very costly. This contribution tries to shed new light on problems that arise when
complex systems are modeled. While the arguments can be transferred to many different systems, the
related scientific challenges are illustrated for social, economic, and traffic systems. The contribution
discusses issues that are sometimes overlooked and tries to overcome some frequent misunderstandings
and controversies of the past. At the same time, it is highlighted how some long-standing scientific
puzzles may be solved by considering non-linear models of heterogeneous agents with spatio-temporal
interactions. As a result of the analysis, it is concluded that a paradigm shift towards a pluralistic or
possibilistic modeling approach, which integrates multiple world views, is overdue. In this connection, it is
argued that it can be useful to combine many different approaches to obtain a good picture of reality, even
though they may be inconsistent. Finally, it is identified what would be profitable areas of collaboration
between the socio-economic, natural, and engineering sciences.
1 Introduction
When the father of sociology, August Comte, came up with the idea of a “social physics”, he hoped that
the puzzles of social systems could be revealed with a natural science approach [1]. However, progress
along these lines was very difficult and slow. Today, most sociologists do not believe in his positivistic
approach anymore. The question is whether this proves the failure of the positivistic approach or whether
it just shows that social scientists did not use the right methods so far. After all, social scientists rarely
have a background in the natural sciences, while the positivistic approach has been most successful in
fields like physics, chemistry, or biology.
In fact, recently new scientific communities are developing, and they are growing quickly. They call
themselves socio-physicists, mathematical sociologists, computational social scientists, agent-based mod-
elers, complexity or network scientists. Researchers from the social sciences, physics, computer science,
biology, mathematics, and artificial intelligence research are addressing the challenges of social and eco-
nomic systems with mathematical or computational models and lab or web experiments. Will they end
up with resignation in view of the complexity of social and economic systems, or will they manage to
push our knowledge of social systems considerably beyond what was imaginable even a decade ago? Will
August Comte’s vision of sociology as “the queen of the sciences” [2] finally become true?
My own judgement is that it is less hopeless to develop mathematical models for social systems than
most social scientists usually think, but more difficult than most natural scientists imagine. The crucial
question is, how one can make substantial progress in a field as complicated and multi-faceted as the
the social sciences, and how the current obstacles can be overcome? And what are these obstacles, after
all? The current contribution tries to make the controversial issues better understandable to scientific
communities with different approaches and backgrounds. While each of the points may be well-known
to some scientists, they are probably not so obvious for others. Putting it differently, this contribution
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2tries to build bridges between different disciplines interested in similar subjects, and make thoughts
understandable to scientific communities with different points of views.
A dialogue between social, natural and economic sciences seems to be desireable not only for the sake
of an intellectual exchange on fundamental scientific problems. It also appears that science is lacking
behind the pace of upcoming socio-economic problems, and that we need to become more efficient in ad-
dressing practical problems [3]. President Lee C. Bollinger of New York’s prestigious Columbia University
formulated the challenge as follows: “The forces affecting societies around the world ... are powerful and
novel. The spread of global market systems ... are ... reshaping our world ..., raising profound questions.
These questions call for the kinds of analyses and understandings that academic institutions are uniquely
capable of providing. Too many policy failures are fundamentally failures of knowledge.” [4]
The fundamental and practical scientific challenges require from us that we do everything we can to
find solutions, and that we do not give up before the limits or failure of a scientific approach have become
obvious. As will be argued in Sec. 5, different methods should be seen complementary to each other and,
even when inconsistent, may allow one to get a better picture than any single method can do, no matter
how powerful it may seem.
2 Particular Difficulties of Modeling Socio-Economic Systems
When speaking about socio-economic systems in the following, it could be anything from families over
social groups or companies up to countries, markets, or the world economy including the financial system
and the labor market. The constituting system elements or system components would be individuals,
groups, or companies, for example, depending on the system under consideration and the level of descrip-
tion one is interested in.
On the macroscopic (systemic) level, social and economic systems have some features that seem to be
similar to properties of some physical or biological systems. One example is the hierarchical organization.
In social systems, individuals form groups, which establish organizations, companies, parties, etc., which
make up states, and these build communities of states (like the United States or the European Union,
for example). In physics, elementary particles form atoms, which create molecules, which may form solid
bodies, fluids or gases, which together make up our planet, which belongs to a solar system, and a galaxy.
In biology, cells are composed of organelles, they form tissues and organs, which are the constituting
parts of living creatures, and these make up ecosystems.
Such analogies are certainly interesting and have been discussed, for example, by Herbert Spencer [5]
and later on in systems theory [6]. It is not so obvious, however, how much one can learn from them.
While physical systems are often well understood by mathematical models, biological and socio-economic
systems are usually not. This often inspires physicists to transfer their models to biological and socio-
economic models (see the discussion in Sec. 4.4), while biologists, social scientists, and economists often
find such attempts “physicalistic” and inadequate. In fact, social and economic systems possess a number
of properties, which distinguish them from most physical ones:
1. the number of variables involved is typically (much) larger (considering that each human brain
contains about 1000 billion neurons),
2. the relevant variables and parameters are often unknown and hard to measure (the existence of
“unknown unknowns” is typical),
3. the time scales on which the variables evolve are often not well separated from each other,
4. the statistical variation of measurements is considerable and masks laws of social behavior, where
they exist (if they exist at all),
5. frequently there is no ensemble of equivalent systems, but just one realization (one human history),
36. empirical studies are limited by technical, financial, and ethical issues,
7. it is difficult or impossible to subdivide the system into simple, non-interacting subsystems that
can be separately studied,
8. the observer participates in the system and modifies social reality,
9. the non-linear and/or network dependence of many variables leads to complex dynamics and struc-
tures, and sometimes paradoxical effects,
10. interaction effects are often strong, and emergent phenomena are ubiquitous (hence, not under-
standable by the measurement and quantification of the individual system elements),
11. factors such as a large degree of randomness and heterogeneity, memory, anticipation, decision-
making, communication, consciousness, and the relevance of intentions and individual interpreta-
tions complicate the analysis and modeling a lot,
12. the same applies to human features such as emotions, creativity, and innovation,
13. the impact of information is often more decisive for the behavior of a socio-economic system than
physical aspects (energy, matter) or our biological heritage,
14. the “rules of the game” and the interactions in a social or economic system may change over time,
in contrast to what we believe to be true for the fundamental laws and forces of physics,
15. in particular, social systems are influenced by normative and moral issues, which are variable.
For such reasons, social systems are the most complex systems we know. They are certainly more complex
than physical systems are. As a consequence, a considerable fraction of sociologists thinks that mathe-
matical models for social systems are destined to fail, while most economists and many quantitatively
oriented social scientists seem to believe in models with many variables. Both is in sharp contrast to the
often simple models containing a few variables only that physicists tend to propose. So, who is right?
The following discussion suggests that this is the wrong question. We will therefore discuss why differ-
ent scientists, who apparently deal with the same research subject, come to so dramatically different
conclusions.
It is clear that this situation has some undesireable side effects: Scientists belonging to different
schools of thought often do not talk to each other, do not learn from each other, and probably reject each
others’ project proposals more frequently. It is, therefore, important to make the approach of each school
understandable to the others.
3 Modeling Approaches
3.1 Qualitative Descriptions
Many social scientists think that the fourteen challenges listed above are so serious that it is hopeless
to come up with mathematical models for social systems. A common view is that all models are wrong.
Thus, a widespread approach is to work out narratives, i.e. to give a qualitative (non-mathematical and
non-algorithmic) description of reality that is as detailed as possible. This may be compared with a
naturalist painting.
Narratives are important, as they collect empirical evidence and create knowledge that is essential for
modelers sooner or later. Good models require several steps of intellectual digestion, and the first and
very essential one is to create a picture of the system one is interested in and to make sense of what is
going on in it. This step is clearly indispensible. Nevertheless, the approach is sometimes criticized for
reasons such as the following:
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typically performed by the same brain (of a single scientist). Since these processes strongly involve
the observer, it is hard or even impossible to provide an objective description of a system at this level
of detail. Therefore, different scientists may analyze and interpret the system in different, subjective
ways. What is an important aspect for one observer may be an irrelevant detail for another one, or
may even be overlooked. In German, there is a saying that ”one does not see the forest amongst
all the trees”, i.e. details may hide the bigger picture or the underlying mechanisms. In the natural
sciences, this problem has been partially overcome by splitting up observation, description, and
interpretation into separate processes: measurements, statistical analysis, and modeling attempts.
Many of these steps are supported by technical instruments, computers, and software tools to
reduce the individual element and subjective influence. Obviously, this method can not be easily
transferred to the study of social systems, as individuals and subjective interpretations can have
important impacts on the overall system.
• Despite its level of detail, a narrative is often not suited to be translated into a computer program
that would reproduce the phenomena depicted by it. When scientists try to do so, in many cases it
turns out that the descriptions are ambiguous, i.e. not detailed enough to come up with a unique
computer model. In other words, different programmers would end up with different computer
models, producing different results. Therefore, Joshua Epstein claims: “If you didn’t grow it, you
didn’t explain it” [7] (where “grow” stands here for “simulate in the computer”). For example, if
system elements interact in a non-linear way, i.e. effects are not proportional to causes, there are
many different possibilities to specify the non-linearity: is it a parabola, an exponential dependence,
a square root, a logarithm, a power law, ...? Or when a system shows partially random behavior,
is it best described by additive or multiplicative noise, internal or external noise? Is it chaotic or
turbulent behavior, or are the system elements just heterogeneous? It could even be a combination
of several options. What differences would these various possibilities make?
3.2 Detailed Models
In certain fields of computational social science or economics, it is common to develop computer models
that grasp as many details as possible. They would try to implement all the aspects of the system under
consideration, which are known to exist. In the ideal case, these facts would be properties, which have been
repeatedly observed in several independent studies of the kind of system under consideration, preferably
in different areas of the world. In some sense, they would correspond to the overlapping part of many
narratives. Thus, one could assume that these properties would be characteristic features of the kind of
system under consideration, not just properties of a single and potentially quite particular system.
Despite it sounds logical to proceed in this way, there are several criticisms of this approach:
• In case of many variables, it is difficult to specify their interdependencies in the right way. (Just
remember the many different possibilities to specify non-linear interactions and randomness in the
system.)
• Some models containing many variables may have a large variety of different solutions, which may
be highly dependent on the initial or boundary conditions, or the history of the system. This
particularly applies to models containing non-linear interactions, which may have multiple stable
solutions or non-stationary ones (such as periodic or non-periodic oscillations), or they may even
show chaotic behavior. Therefore, depending on the parameter choice and the initial condition,
such a model could show virtually any kind of behavior. While one may think that such a model
would be a flexible world model, it would in fact be just a fit model. Moreover, it would probably
not be very helpful to understand the mechanisms underlying the behavior of the system. As John
von Neumann pointed out: “With four parameters I can fit an elephant and with five I can make
5him wiggle his trunk.” This wants to say that a model with many parameters can fit anything and
explains nothing. This is certainly an extreme standpoint, but there is some truth in it.
• When many variables are considered, it is hard to judge which ones are independent of each other
and which ones not. If variables are mutually dependent, one effect may easily be considered twice
in the model, which would lead to biased results. Dependencies among variables may also imply
serious problems in the process of parameter calibration. The problem is known, for example, from
sets of linear equations containing collinear variables.
• Models with many variables, particularly non-linear ones, may be sensitive to the exact specification
of parameters, initial, or boundary conditions, or to small random effects. Phenomena like hysteresis
(history-dependence) [9], phase transitions [10] or “catastrophes” [11], chaos [12], or noise-induced
transitions [13] illustrate this clearly.
• The parameters, initial and boundary conditions of models with many variables are hard to calibrate.
If small (or no) data sets are available, the model is under-specified, and the remaining data must
be estimated based on “expert knowledge”, intuition or rules of thumb, but due to the sensitivity
problem, the results may be quite misleading. The simulation of many scenarios with varying
parameters can overcome the problem in part, as it gives an idea of the possible variability of
systemic behaviors. However, the resulting variability can be quite large. Moreover, a full exploration
of the parameter space is usually not possible when a model contains many parameters, not even
with supercomputers.
• In models with many variables, it is often difficult to identify the mechanism underlying a certain
phenomenon or system behavior. The majority of variables may be irrelevant for it. However, in
order to understand a phenomenon, it is essential to identify the variables and interactions (i.e. the
interdependencies among them) that matter.
3.3 Simple Models
Simple models try to avoid (some of) the problems of detailed models by restricting themselves to a
minimum number of variables needed to reproduce a certain effect, phenomenon or system behavior. They
are aiming at a better understanding of so-called “stylized facts”, i.e. simplified, abstracted, or “ideal-
typical” observations (the “essence”). For example, while detailed descriptions pay a lot of attention
to the particular content of social norms or opinions and how they change over time in relation to the
respective cultural setting, simple models abstract from the content of social norms and opinions. They
try to formulate general rules of how social norms come about or how opinions change, independently
of their content, with the aim of understanding why these processes are history-dependent (“hysteretic”)
and in what way they dependent on microscopic and macroscopic influences.
It is clear that simple models do not describe (and do not even want to describe) all details of a
system under consideration, and for this reason they are also called minimal or toy models sometimes.
The approach may be represented by a few quotes. The “KISS principle” of model building demands
to “keep it simple and straightforward” [14]. This is also known as Occam’s (or Ockham’s) razor, or as
principle of parsimony. Albert Einstein as well demanded [15]: “Make everything as simple as possible,
but not simpler”.
A clear advantage of simple models is that they may facilitate an analytical treatment and, thereby, a
better understanding. Moreover, it is easy to extend simple models in a way that allows one to consider a
heterogeneity among the system components. This supports the consideration of effects of individuality
and the creation of simple “ecological models” for socio-economic systems. Nevertheless, as George Box
puts it: “Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful” [16].
6The last quote touches an important point. The choice of the model and its degree of detail should
depend on the purpose of a model, i.e. its range of application. For example, there is a large variety
of models used for the modeling and simulation of freeway traffic. The most prominent model classes
are “microscopic” car-following models, focussing on the interaction of single vehicles, “mesoscopic”
gas-kinetic models, describing the change of the velocity distribution of vehicles in space and time,
“macroscopic” fluid-dynamic models, restricting themselves to changes of the average speed and density
of vehicles, and cellular automata, which simplify microscopic ones in favor of simulation speed. Each type
of model has certain ranges of application. Macroscopic and cellular automata models, for example, are
used for large-scale traffic simulations to determine the traffic situation on freeways and perform short-
term forecasts, while microscopic ones are used to study the interaction of vehicles and to develop driver
assistance systems. For some of these models, it is also known how they are mathematically connected with
each other, i.e. macroscopic ones can be derived from microscopic ones by certain kinds of simplifications
(approximations) [17,18].
The main purpose of models is to guide people’s thoughts. Therefore, models may be compared with
city maps. It is clear that maps simplify facts, otherwise they would be quite confusing. We do not want to
see any single detail (e.g. each tree) in them. Rather we expect a map to show the facts we are interested
in, and depending on the respective purpose, there are quite different maps (showing streets, points of
interest, topography, supply networks, industrial production, mining of natural resources, etc.).
One common purpose of models is prediction, which is mostly (mis)understood as “forecast”, while
it often means “the identification of implications regarding how a system is expected to behave under
certain conditions”. It is clear that, in contrast to the motion of a planet around the sun, the behavior of
an individual can hardly be forecasted. Nevertheless, there are certain tendencies or probabilities of doing
certain things, and we usually have our hypotheses of what our friends, colleagues, or family members
would do in certain situations. It turns out that, when many people interact, the aggregate behavior can
sometimes be quite predictable. For example, the “wisdom of crowds” is based on the statistical law of
large numbers [19], according to which individual variations (here: the independent estimation of facts)
are averaged out.
Furthermore, interactions between many individuals tend to restrict the degree of freedom regarding
what each individual can or will do. This is, why the concept of “social norms” is so important. Another
example is the behavior of a driver, which is constrained by other surrounding vehicles. Therefore, the
dynamics of traffic flows can be mathematically well understood [18,20]. Nevertheless, one cannot exactly
forecast the moment in which free traffic flow breaks down and congestion sets in, and therefore, one
cannot forecast travel times well. The reason for this is the history-dependent dynamics, which makes it
dependent on random effects, namely on the size of perturbations in the traffic flow. However, what can
be predicted is what are the possible traffic states and what are conditions under which they can occur.
One can also identify the probability of traffic flows to break down under certain flow conditions, and
it is possible to estimate travel times under free and congested flow conditions, given a measurement of
the inflows. The detail that cannot be forecasted is the exact moment in which the regime shift from free
to congested traffic flow occurs, but this detail has a dramatic influence on the system. It can determine
whether the travel time for a certain freeway section is 2 minutes or 20 minutes.
However, it is important to underline that, in contrast to what is frequently stated, the purpose of
developing models is not only prediction. Joshua Epstein, for example, discusses 16 other reasons to build
models, including explanation, guiding data collection, revealing dynamical analogies, discovering new
questions, illuminating core uncertainties, demonstrating tradeoffs, training practitioners, and decision
support, particularly in crises [21].
Of course, not everybody favors simple models, and typical criticisms of them are:
• It is usually easy to find empirical evidence, which is not compatible with simple models (even
though, to be fair, one would have to consider the purpose they have been created for, when
judging them). Therefore, one can say that simple models tend to over-simplify things and leave
7out more or less important facts. For this reason, they may be considered inadequate to describe a
system under consideration.
• Due to their simplicity, it may be dangerous to take decisions based on their implications.
• It may be difficult to decide, what are the few relevant variables and parameters that a simple
model should consider. Scientists may even disagree about the stylized facts to model.
• Simple models tend to reproduce a few stylized facts only and are often not able to consistently
reproduce a large number of observations. The bigger picture and the systemic view may get lost.
• Making simple models compatible with a long list of stylized facts often requires to improve or
extend the models by additional terms or parameter dependencies. Eventually, this improvement
process ends up with detailed models, leaving one with the problems specified there (see Sec. 3.2).
• Certain properties and behaviors of socio-economic systems may not be understandable with meth-
ods that have been successful in physics: Subdividing the system into subsystems, analyzing and
modeling these subsystems, and putting the models together may not lead to a good description of
the overall system. For example, several effects may act in parallel and have non-separable orders
of magnitude. This makes it difficult or impossible to start with a zeroth or first order approxi-
mation and to improve it by adding correction terms (as it is done, for example, when the falling
of a body is described by the effect of gravitational acceleration plus the effect of air resistance).
Summing up the mathematical terms that describe the different effects may not converge. It is also
not clear whether complex systems can be always understood via simple principles, as the success
of complexity science might suggest. Some complex systems may require complex models to explain
them, and there may even be phenomena, the complexity of which is irreducible. Turbulence [22]
could be such an example. While it is a long-standing problem that has been addressed by many
bright people, it has still not been explained completely.
It should be added, however, that we do not know today, whether the last point is relevant, how relevant
it is, and where. So far, it is a potential problem one should be aware of. It basically limits the realm, in
which classical modeling will be successful, but we have certainly not reached these limits, yet.
3.4 Modeling Complex Systems
Modeling socio-economic systems is less hopeless than many social scientists may think [23]. In recent
years, considerable progress has been made in a variety of relevant fields, including
• experimental research [24–26],
• data mining [27],
• network analysis [28],
• agent-based modeling [7, 29],
• the theory of complex systems (including self-organization phenomena and chaos) [31],
• the theory of phase transitions [10] (“catastrophes” [11]), critical phenomena [32], and extreme
events [33], and
• the engineering of intelligent systems [34,35].
These fields have considerably advanced our understanding of complex systems. In this connection, one
should be aware that the term “complexity” is used in many different ways. In the following, we will
distinguish three kinds of complexity:
81. structural,
2. dynamical, and
3. functional complexity.
One could also add algorithmic complexity, which is given by the amount of computational time needed
to solve certain problems. Some optimization problems, such as the optimization of logistic or traffic
signal operations, are algorithmically complex [36].
Linear models are not considered to be complex, no matter how many terms they contain. An example
for structural complexity is a car or airplane. They are constructed in a way that is dynamically more
or less deterministic and well controllable, i.e. dynamically simple, and they also serve relatively simple
functions (the motion from a location A to another location B). While the acceleration of a car or a
periodic oscillation would be an example for a simple dynamics, examples for complex dynamical behavior
are non-periodic changes, deterministic chaos, or history-dependent behaviors. Complex dynamics can
already be produced by simple sets of non-linearly coupled equations. While a planet orbiting around
the sun follows a simple dynamics, the interaction of three celestial bodies can already show a chaotic
dynamics. Ecosystems, the human body or the brain would be functionally complex systems. The same
would hold for the world wide web, financial markets, or running a country or multi-national company.
While the interrelation between function, form and dynamics still poses great scientific challenges,
the understanding of structurally or dynamically complex systems has significantly progressed. Simple
agent-based models of systems with a large number of interacting system elements (be it particles, cars,
pedestrians, individuals, or companies) show properties, which remind of socio-economic systems. As-
suming that these elements mutually adapt to each other through non-linear or network interactions (i.e.
that the elements are influenced by their environment while modifying it themselves), one can find a
rich, history-dependent system behavior, which is often counter-intuitive, hardly predictable, and seem-
ingly uncontrollable. These models challenge our common way of thinking and help to grasp behaviors
of complex systems, which are currently a nightmare for decision-makers.
For example, complex systems are often unresponsive to control attempts, while close to “critical
points” (also known as “tipping points”), they may cause sudden (and often unexpected) phase transi-
tion (so-called “regime shifts”). These correspond to discontinuous changes in the system behavior. The
breakdown of free traffic flow would be a harmless example, while a systemic crisis (such as a financial
collapse or revolution) would be a more dramatic one. Such systemic crises are often based on cascade
spreading through network interactions [37]. Complex adaptive systems also allow one to understand
extreme events as a result of strong interactions in a system (rather than as externally caused shocks).
Furthermore, the interaction of many system elements may give rise to interesting self-organization phe-
nomena and emergent properties, which cannot be understood from the behaviors of the single elements
or by adding them up. Typical examples are collective patterns of motion in pedestrian crowds or what
is sometimes called “swarm intelligence” [38].
Considering this, it is conceivable that many of today’s puzzles in the social sciences may one day
be explained by simple models, namely as emergent phenomena resulting from interactions of many
individuals and/or other system elements. Note that emergent phenomena cannot be explained by linear
models (which are most common in many areas of quantitative empirical research in the social sciences
and economics). Unfortunately, there is no standard way to set up models of emergent phenomena. On
the one hand, there are many possible kinds of non-linear functional dependencies (“interactions”) (see
the end of Sec. 3.1). On the other hand, model assumptions that appear plausible do often not produce
the desired or expected effects.
In spite of these difficulties, taking into account time-dependent change, a non-linear coupling of
variables, spatial or network interactions, randomness, and/or correlations (i.e. features that many social
and economic models currently do not consider to the necessary extent), can sometimes deliver unexpected
solutions of long-standing puzzles. For example, it turns out that representative agent models (which are
9common in economics) can be quite misleading, as the same kinds of interactions among the system
components can imply completely different or even opposite conclusions, when interactions take place in
a socio-economic network rather than with average (or randomly chosen) interaction partners [39]. In other
words, models often produce counter-intuitive results, when spatio-temporal or network interactions are
relevant. Therefore, a simple non-linear model may explain phenomena, which complicated linear models
may fail to reproduce. In fact, this generally applies to systems that can show several possible states (i.e.
systems which do not have just one stable equilibrium). Out-of-equilibrium models are also required for
the description of systemic crises such as the current financial crisis [37].
4 Challenges of Socio-Economic Modeling
Many people before and after Popper have been thinking about the logic of scientific discovery [40]. A
wide-spread opinion is that a good model should be applicable to measurements of many systems of
a certain kind, in particular to measurements in different areas of the world. The more observations a
model can explain and the less parameters it has, the more powerful it is usually considered to be. Models
with a few parameters can often be easier to calibrate, and cause-and-effect relationships may be better
identified, but one can usually not expect that these models would provide an exact description of reality.
Nevertheless, a good model should make predictions regarding some possible, but previously unobserved
system behaviors. In this connnection, prediction does not necessarily mean the forecast of a certain event
at a specific future point in time. It means a specific system behavior that is expected to occur (or to be
possible) under certain conditions (e.g. for certain parameter combinations or certain initial conditions).
When such conditions apply and the system shows the expected behavior, this would be considered
to verify the model, while the model would be falsified or seriously questioned, if the predicted system
behavior would not occur. By experimentally challenging models based on their predictions (implications),
it has been possible in the natural sciences to rate alternative models based on their quality in reproducing
and predicting measured data. Unfortunately, it turns out that this approach is less suited to identify “the
right model” of a social or economic system under consideration. As we will discuss in the following, this
is not only due to the smaller amount of data available on most aspects of social and economic systems
and due to experimental limitations for financial, technical and ethical reasons...
4.1 Promises and Difficulties of the Experimental Approach
So far, it is very expensive to carry out social and economic experiments, for example in the laboratory.
While the study of human behavior under controlled conditions has become a common research method
not only in psychology, but also in experimental economics and in sociology, the number of individuals
that can be studied in such experiments is limited. This implies a large degree of statistical variation,
which makes it difficult to determine behavioral laws or to distinguish between different models. The
statistical noise creates something like a foggy situation, which makes it difficult to see what is going on.
In physics, this problem can be usually solved by better measurement methods (apart from uncertainty
that results from the laws of quantum mechanics). In social systems, however, there is an irreducible
degree of randomness. The behavior varies not only between individuals due to their heterogeneity (dif-
ferent “personality”). It also varies from one instance to another, i.e. the decision-making of an individual
is usually not deterministic. This could be due to various reasons: unknown external influences (details
attracting the attention of the individual) or internal factors (exploration behavior, decisions taken by
mistake, memory effects, etc.). The large level of behavioral variability within and between individuals is
probably not only due to the different histories individuals have, but also due to the fact that exploration
behavior and the heterogeneity of behaviors are beneficial for the learning of individuals and for the
adaptibility of human groups to various environmental conditions. Applying a theory of social evolution
would, therefore, suggest that randomness is significant in social and economic systems, because it in-
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creases system performance. Besides, heterogeneity can also have individual benefits, as differentiation
facilitates specialization. The benefit of a variation between individuals is also well-known from ecological
systems [41].
Besides impeding the discovery of behavioral laws, the limited number of participants in laboratory
experiments also restricts the number of repetitions and the number of experimental settings or parameter
combinations that can be studied. Scanning parameter spaces is impossible so far, while it would be useful
to detect different system behaviors and to determine under which conditions they occur. It can be quite
tricky to select suitable system parameters (e.g. the payoff matrix in a game-theoretical experiment).
Computer simulations suggest that one would find interesting results mainly, if the parameters selected
in different experimental setups imply different system behaviors, i.e. if they belong to different “phases”
in the parameter space (see Fig. 1). In order to determine such parameter combinations, it is advised to
perform computer simulations before, to determine the phase diagram for the system under consideration
[26]. The problem, however, is that the underlying model is unlikely to be perfect, i.e. even a good social
or economic model is expected to make predictions which are only approximately valid. As a consequence,
the effect one likes to show may appear for (somewhat) different parameter values, or it may not occur
at all (considering the level of randomness) [42].
4.2 Several Models Are Right
The above mentioned properties of socio-economic systems imply that it is difficult to select the “right”
model among several alternative ones. For an illustration, let us take car-following models, as they are
used for the simulation of urban or freeway traffic. Thanks to radar sensors, it has become possible to
measure the acceleration of vehicles as a function of the typical variables of car-following models, which
are the distance to the car ahead, the own speed, and the speed difference. When fitting the parameters of
different car-following models to data of such measurements, it turns out that the remaining error between
computer simulations and measurements is about the same for most of the models. The calibration error
varies between 12 and 17 percent, and according to the authors, “no model can be denoted to be the
best” [43]. When the error of different models (i.e. the deviation between model and data) is determined
for a new data set (using the model parameters determined with the previous data set), the resulting
validation error usually varies between 17 and 22 percent (larger validation errors mainly result, when the
calibration data set is overfitted) [43]. Again, the performance of the different models is so similar that it
would not be well justified to select one of them as the “correct” model and exclude all the others. A closer
analysis shows that the parameters of the car-following dynamics varies among different drivers, but the
behavior of specific drivers also vary over time [44]. We have to assume that the same applies to basically
all kinds of behavior, not only for driving a car. Moreover, it is likely that many behaviors (such as
decision-making behaviors) vary even more than car-following behavior does. As a consequence, it would
be even more difficult to distinguish between different models by means of empirical or experimental
data, which would mean that we may have to accept several models to be (possibly) “right”, even when
they are not consistent with each other. In other words, the question “What is the best model?” or “How
to choose the model?” may not be decidable in a reasonable way, as is also suggested by the next section.
This situation reminds a bit of Go¨del’s Undecidability Theorem [45], which relates to the (in)completeness
of certain axiom systems.
It may be tempting to determine the best model as the one which is most successful, for example
in terms of the number of citations it gets. However, success is not necessarily an indicator of a good
model. Let us take models used for stock trading as an example. Clearly, even if the stock prices vary
in a perfectly random manner and if the average success of each model is the same over an infinite time
period; when different traders apply different trading models, they will be differently successful at any
chosen point in time. Therefore, one would consider some models more successful than others, while this
would be only a matter of luck. As a matter of chance, at other points in time, different models would
be the most successful ones.
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Figure 1. Phase diagram showing the finally remaining strategies in the spatial public goods game
with cooperators (C), defectors (D), cooperators who punish defectors (PC) and hypocritical punishers
(PD), who punish other defectors while defecting themselves (after Ref. [39]). Initially, each of the four
strategies occupies 25% of the sites of the square lattice, and their distribution is uniform in space.
However, due to their evolutionary competition, two or three strategies die out after some time. The
finally resulting state depends on the punishment cost, the punishment fine, and the synergy r of
cooperation (the factor by which cooperation increases the sum of investments). The displayed phase
diagrams are for (a) r = 2.0, (b) r = 3.5, and (c) r = 4.4. (d) Enlargement of the small- cost area for
r = 3.5. Solid separating lines indicate that the resulting fractions of all strategies change continuously
with a modification of the punishment cost and punishment fine, while broken lines correspond to
discontinuous changes. All diagrams show that cooperators and defectors cannot stop the spreading of
costly punishment, if only the fine-to-cost ratio is large enough (see green PC area). Note that, in the
absence of defectors, the spreading of punishing cooperators is extremely slow and follows a voter model
kind of dynamics. A small level of strategy mutations (which continuously creates a small number of
strategies of all kinds, in particular defectors) can largely accelerate the spreading of them. Furthermore,
there are parameter regions where punishing cooperators can crowd out ”second-order free-riders”
(non-punishing cooperators) in the presence of defectors (D+PC). Finally, for low punishment costs,
but moderate punishment fines, it may happen that ”moralists”, who cooperate and punish
non-cooperative behavior, can only survive through an ”unholy alliance” with ”immoral”, hypocritical
punishers (PD+PC). For related videos, see http://www.soms.ethz.ch/research/secondorder-freeriders
or http://www.matjazperc.com/games/moral.html.
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Of course, if behaviors are not just random so that behavioral laws that go beyond statistical distri-
butions exist, some models should be better than others, and it should eventually be possible to separate
“good” from “bad” models through the “wisdom of crowds” effect. However, the “wisdom of crowds”
assumes independent judgements, while scientists have repeated interactions. It has be shown experimen-
tally that this tends to create consensus, but that this consensus will often deviate from the truth [46].
The problem results from social influence, which creates a herding effect that can undermine the “wis-
dom of crowds”. Of course, this mainly applies, when the facts are not sufficiently obvious, which is the
case in the social sciences due to the high variability of observations, while the problem is less press-
ing in the natural sciences thanks to the higher measurement precision. Nevertheless, the physicist Max
Planck is known for the quote: “Science progresses funeral by funeral” [47]. Kuhn’s study of scientific
revolutions [48] suggests as well that scientific progress is not continuous, but there are sudden paradigm
shifts. This reveals the problem of herding effects. Even a collective agreement is no guarantee for the
correctness of a model, as the replacement of classical mechanics by relativistic quantum theory shows.
In other words, success is no necessarily an indicator for good models. It may just be an indicator for
what model is most fashionable at a given time. The problem becomes worse by the academic selection
process that decides, what scientists make a carreer and which ones not. It creates a considerable inertia
in the adjustment to new knowledge, i.e. scientific trends are likely to persist longer than what is justified
by facts.
4.3 No Known Model is Right
A typical approach in the natural sciences is to verify or falsify previously untested predictions (impli-
cations) of alternative models by sometimes quite sophisticated experiments. Only in the minority of
cases, two alternative theories turn out to be the same, like the wave and the particle picture of quantum
mechanics. In most cases, however, two theories A and B are non-identical and inconsistent, which means
that they should make different predictions in particular kinds of situations. Experiments are performed
to find out whether theory A or theory B is right, or whether both of them deviate from the measure-
ments. If the experimental data confirm theory A and are not compatible with theory B (i.e. deviate
significantly from it), one would discard theory B forever. In this way, experiments are thought to narrow
down the number of alternative theories, until a single, “true” theory remains.
When social or economic systems are modeled, the following situation is not unlikely to happen:
Scientists identify mutually incompatible predictions of theories A and B, and it turns out that an
experiment supports theory A, but not theory B. One day, another scientist identifies a different set
of incompatible predictions, and another experiment supports theory B, but not theory A. Due to the
inherent simplifications of socio-economic models, for any model it should easy to find empirical evidence
that contradicts it. What should one do in such cases? Giving up on modeling would probably not be
the best idea. Generalizing a model is always possible, but it will usually end up with detailed models,
which implies a number of problems that have been outlined in Sec. ??. One could also stay with many
particular models and determine their respective ranges of validity. This, however, will never result in a
holistic or systemic model. A possible way out would be the approach of pluralistic modeling outlined in
Sec. ??.
Modeling in modern physics seems to face similar problems. While one would expect that each exper-
iment narrows down the number of remaining, non-falsified models, one actually observes that, after each
experiment, scientists come up with a number of new models. As people say: ”Each answered question
raises ten new ones.” In fact, there is an abundance of elementary particle models, and the same applies
to cosmological models. Many models require to assume the existence of factors that have never been
measured and perhaps will never be measured, such as Higgs bosons, dark matter, or dark energy. We
will probably have to live with the fact that models are just models that never grasp all details of reality.
Moreover, as has been pointed out, understanding elementary particles and fundamental forces in physics
would not explain at all what is happening in the world around us [49, 50]. Many emergent phenom-
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ena that we observe in the biological, economic and social world will never be derived from elementary
particle physics, because emergent properties of a system cannot be understood from the properties of
its system components alone. They usually come about by the interaction of a large number of system
components. Let us be honest: We do not even understand the particular properties of water, as simple
as H2O molecules may be.
Generally, there is a serious lack in understanding the connection between function, dynamics, and
form. Emergence often seems to have an element of surprise. The medical effect of a new chemical drug
cannot be understood by computer simulation alone. So far, we also do not understand emotions and
consciousness, and we cannot calculate the biological fitness of a species in the computer. The most
exciting open puzzles in science concern such emergent phenomena. It would be interesting to study,
whether social and economic phenomena such as trust, solidarity, and economic value can be understood
as emergent phenomena as well [3].
4.4 The Model Captures Some Features, But May Be Inadequate
Scientists are often prompted to transfer their methods to another areas of application, based on analogies
that they see between the behavior of different systems. Systems science is based on such analogies, and
physicists generalize their methods as well. The question is how useful a “physicalist approach” can be,
which transfers properties of many-particle systems to social or economic systems, although individuals
are certainly more intelligent than particles and have many more behavioral degrees of freedom.
Of course, physicists would never claim that particle models could provide an exact description of social
or economic systems. Why, then, do they think the models could make a contribution to the understanding
of these systems? This is, because they have experience with what can happen in systems characterized
by the non-linear interaction of many system components in space and time, and when randomness
plays a role. The know how self-organized collective phenomena on the “macroscopic” (aggregate) level
can results from interactions on the “microscopic” (individual) level. And they have learned, how this
can lead to phase transitions (also called “regime shifts” or “catastrophes”), when a system parameter
(“control parameter”) crosses a critical point (“tipping point”). Furthermore, they have discovered that,
at a critical point, the system typically shows a scale-free behavior (i.e. power laws or other fat-tail
distributions rather than Gaussian distributions).
It is important to note, that the characteristic features of the system at the critical point tend to
be “universal”, i.e. they do not depend on the details of the interactions. This is, why physicists think
they can abstract from the details. Of course, details are expected to be relevant when the system is not
close to a critical point. It should also be added, that there are a couple of different kinds of universal
behavior, so-called universality classes. Nevertheless, many-particle models may allow one to get a better
understanding of regime shifts, which are not so well understood by most established models in economics
or the social sciences. However, if the tipping point is far away, the usefulness of many-particle models is
limited, and detailed descriptions, as they are favored by economists and social scientists, appear to be
more adequate.
Sometimes, it is not so clear how far analogies can carry, or if they are useful at all. Let us take neural
network models. In a certain sense, they can be used to model learning, generalization, and abstraction.
However, the hope that they would explain the functioning of the brain has been largely disappointed.
Today, we know that the brain works quite differently, but neural network theory has given birth to
many interesting engineering applications that are even commerically applied. Let us consider models of
cooperation based on coupled oscillators as a second example. Without any doubt, the synchronization
of cyclical behavior is among the most interesting collective phenomena we know of, and models allow
one to study if and how groups of oscillators will coordinate each other or fall apart into subgroups
(which are not synchronized among each other, while the oscillators in each of them are) [51]. Despite
this analogy to group formation and group dynamics, it is not clear, what we can learn from such models
for social systems. A similar point is sometimes raised for spin models, which have been proposed to
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describe opinion formation processes or the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma situations. In
this connection, it has been pointed out that social interactions cannot always be broken down into binary
interactions. Some interactions involve three or more individuals at the same time, which may change
the character of the interaction. Nevertheless, similar phenomena have been studied by overlaying binary
interactions, and it is not fully clear how important the difference is.
Let us finally ask whether unrealistic assumptions are generally a sign of bad models? The discussion
in Sec. 3.3 suggests that this is not necessarily so. It seems more a matter of the purpose of a model,
which determines the level of simplification, and a matter of the availability of better models, i.e. a matter
of competition. Note, however, that a more realistic model is not necessarily more useful. For example,
many car-following models are more realistic than fluid-dynamic traffic models, but they are not suited
to simulate large-scale traffic networks in real-time. For social systems, there are a number of different
modeling approaches as well, including the following:
• Physical(istic) modeling approach: Socio- and econo-physicists often abstract social interactions
so much that their models come down to multi-particle models (or even spin models with two
behavioral options). Such models focus on the effect of non-linear interactions and are a special
case of bounded rationality models, sometimes called zero-intelligence models [52]. Nevertheless,
they may display features of collective or swarm intelligence [38]. Furthermore, they may be suited
to describe regime shifts or situations of routine choice [53], i.e. situations where individuals react to
their environment in a more or less subconscious and automatic way. Paul Omerod, an economist by
background, argues as follows [54]: “In many social and economic contexts, self-awareness of agents
is of little consequence... No matter how advanced the cognitive abilities of agents in abstract
intellectual terms, it is as if they operate with relatively low cognitive ability within the system...
The more useful ?null model? in social science agent modelling is one close to zero intelligence. It
is only when this fails that more advanced cognition of agents should be considered.”
• Economic modeling approach: Economists seem to have quite the opposite approach. Their concept
of “homo economicus” (the “perfect egoist”) assumes that individuals take strategic decisions,
choosing the optimal of their behavioral options. This requires individuals with infinite memory
and processing capacities. Insofar, one could speak of an infinite-intelligence approach. It is also
known as rational choice approach and has the advantage that the expected behaviors of individuals
can be axiomatically derived. In this way, it was possible to build the voluminous and impressive
theory of mainstream economics. Again, the reliability of this theory depends, of course, on the
realism of its underlying assumptions.
• Sociological modeling approach: Certain schools of sociologists use rational choice models as well.
In contrast to economists, however, they do not generally assume that individuals would radically
optimize their own profit. Their models rather consider that social exchange is more differentiated
and multi-faceted. For example, when choosing their behavior, individuals may not only consider
their own preferences, but the preferences of their interaction partner(s) as well. In recent years,
“fairness theory” has received a particular attention [55] and often been contrasted with rational
choice theory. These social aspects of decision-making are now eventually entering economic thinking
as well [56].
• Psychological modeling approach: Psychologists are perhaps least axiomatic and usually oriented
at empirical observations. They have identified behavioral paradoxies, which are inconsistent with
rational choice theory, at least its classical variant. For example, it turns out that most people
behave in a risk averse way. To account for their observations, new concepts have been developed,
including prospect theory [57], satisficing theory [58], and the concept of behavioral heuristics
[59]. In particular, it turns out that individual decisions depend on the respective framing. In his
Nobel economics lecture, Daniel Kahneman put it this way: “Rational models are psychologically
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unrealistic... the central characteristic of agents is not that they reason poorly, but that they often
act intuitively. And the behavior of these agents is not guided by what they are able to comppute,
but by what they happen to see at a given moment.” Therefore, modern research directions relate
to the cognitive and neurosciences. These results are now finding their way into economics via the
fields of experimental, behavioral, and neuro-economics.
In summary, there is currently no unified approach that scientists generally agree on. Some of the ap-
proaches are more stylized or axiomatic. Others are in better quantitative agreement with empirical or
experimental evidence, but mathematically less elaborated. Therefore, they are theoretically less suited
to derive implications for the behavior in situations, which have not been explored so far. Consequently,
all models have their strengths and weaknesses, no matter how realistic they may be. Moreover, none of
the mathematical models available so far seems to be sophisticated enough to reflect the full complexity
of social interactions between many people.
4.4.1 Different Interpretations of the Same Model
A further difficulty of modeling socio-economic systems is that scientists may not agree on the interpreta-
tion of a model. Let us discuss, for example, the multi-nomial logit model, which has been used to model
decision-making in a large variety of contexts and awarded with the nobel prize [60]. This model can be
derived in a utility-maximizing framework, assuming perfectly rational agents deciding under conditions
of uncertainty. The very same model, however, can also be derived in other ways. For example, it can be
linked to psychological laws or to distributions of statistical physics [61]. In the first case, the interpre-
tation is compatible with the infinite-intelligence approach, while in the last case, it is compatible with
the zero-intelligence approach, which is quite puzzling. A comparison of these approaches is provided by
Ref. [61].
5 Discussion and Outlook
5.1 Pluralistic or Possibilistic Modeling and Multiple World Views: The Way
Out?
Summarizing the previous discussion, it is quite unlikely that we will ever have a single, consistent,
complete, and correct model of socio-economic systems. Maybe we will not even find such a grand unified
theory in physics. Recently, doubts along these lines have even been raised by some particle physicists
[62, 63]. It may be the time to say good bye to a modeling approach that believes in the feasibility of a
unique, general, integrated and consistent model. At least there is no theoretical or empirical evidence
for the possibility of it.
This calls for a paradigm shift in the modeling approach. It is important to be honest that each
model is limited, but most models are useful for something. In other words, we should be tolerant with
regard to each others models and see where they can complement each other. This does not mean that
there would be separate models for non-overlapping parts of the system, one for each subsystem. As
has been pointed out, it is hard to decide whether a particular model is valid, no matter how small the
subsystem is chosen. It makes more sense to assume that each model has a certain validity or usefulness
between 0 and 1, and that the validity furthermore depends on the part or aspect of the system addressed.
This validity may be quantified, for example, by the goodness of fit of a given system or the accuracy
of description of another system of the same kind. As there are often several models for each part or
aspect of a system, one could weight the models with their respective validity, as determined statistically.
Analogously to the “wisdom of crowds” [19], which is based on the law of large numbers, this should lead
to a better quantitative fit or prediction than most (or even each) model in separation, despite the likely
inconsistency among the models. Such an approach could be called a pluralistic modeling approach [64],
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as it tolerates and integrates multiple world views. It may also be called a possibilistic approach [65],
because it takes into account that each model has only a certain likelihood to be valid, i.e. each model
describes a possible truth. However, this should not be misunderstood as an appeal for a subjectivistic
approach. The pluralistic modeling approach still assumes that there is some underlying reality that some,
many, or all of us share (depending on the aspect we talk about).
As shocking as it may be for many scientists and decision-makers to abandon their belief in the
existence of a unique, true model, the pluralistic modeling approach is already being used. Hurricane
prediction and climate modeling are such examples [66]. Even modern airplanes are controlled by multiple
computer programs that are run in parallel. If they do not agree with each other, a majority decision is
taken and implemented. Although this seems pretty scary, this approach has worked surprisingly well so
far. Moreover, when crash tests of newly developed cars are simulated in the computer, the simulations
are again performed with several models, each of which is based on different approximation methods.
It is plausible to assume that pluralistic modeling will be much more widely used in future, whenever a
complex system shall be modeled.
5.2 Where Social Scientists and Natural Scientists or Engineers Can Learn
From Each Other
It has been argued that each modeling approach has its strength and weaknesses, and that they should be
considered complementary rather than competitive. This also implies that scientists of different disciplines
may profit and learn from each other. Areas of fruitful multi-disciplinary collaboration could be:
• the modeling of socio-economic systems themselves,
• understanding the impacts that engineered systems have on the socio-economic world,
• the modeling of the social mechanisms that drive the evolution and spreading of innovations, norms,
technologies, products etc.,
• scientific challenges relating to the managing of complexity and to systems design,
• the application of social coordination and cooperation mechanisms to the creation of self-organizing
technical systems (such as decentralized traffic controls or peer-to-peer systems),
• the development of techno-social systems [67], in which the use of technology is combined with social
competence and human knowledge (such as Wikipedia, prediction markets, recommender systems,
or the semantic web).
Given the large potentials of such collaborations, it is time to overcome disciplinary boundaries. They
seem to make less and less sense. It rather appears that multi-disciplinary, large-scale efforts are needed to
describe and understand socio-economic systems well enough to address practical challenges of humanity
(such as the financial and economic crisis) more successfully [68].
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